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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the government
 
fs choice of three proportional tax bases (a consumption tax, a wage tax and a 
capital income tax) and its influence on the steady-state levels of capital accumulation and social welfare under fiscal 
federalism and the unitary system. We report two main findings: first, the system that uses a consumption and a 
capital income tax bases yields a higher steady state level of capital accumulation than that which uses a wage tax base. 
When each system uses the same tax base, then the steady state levels of capital accumulation under the two systems 
are equivalent. Second, the social welfare levels in fiscal federalism and the unitary system under a consumption tax 
base are equivalent if individuals
 
f rate of time preference just equal to the interest rate, while the social welfare levels 
in the two systems under the wage and capital income tax bases are equivalent if and only if the rate of time 
preference is equal to the population growth rate.
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1.  Introduction 
The  proper  choice  of  tax  bases  has  important  implications  for  the  course  of  saving  and 
economic  growth,  welfare  distribution  among  generations,  and  the  level  of  economic 
efficiency (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987). This paper presents an analysis on the choice of 
three proportional tax bases (a consumption tax, a wage tax and a capital income tax) and its 
influence  toward  the  steady-state  capital  accumulation  and  social  welfare  under  fiscal 
federalism and the unitary system in an overlapping generations model. We introduce three 
tax regimes: the consumption tax, the wage tax, and the capital income tax regimes which are 
independently applied to both systems, fiscal federalism and the unitary system. Under each 
regime, we analyze two possible cases which correspond to each system. In this sense, under 
the  consumption  tax  regime,  we  introduce  case  A,  which  is  when  a  consumption  tax  is 
imposed by the government on young and old generations under fiscal federalism, and case D 
when it is imposed on both generations under the unitary system. On the same fashion under 
the wage tax regime, we introduce case B when a wage tax is imposed by the government 
only on young generation under fiscal federalism and case E when it is imposed only on 
young generation under the unitary system. Lastly, under the capital income tax regime, when 
a  capital  income  tax  is  imposed  by  the  government  only  on  old  generation  under  fiscal 
federalism, we call it case C, while when it is imposed only on old generation under the 
unitary system, we name it case F. We then analyze and make comparisons among these cases 
in terms of their steady-state levels of capital accumulation and social welfare. 
The basic theoretical principle of fiscal federalism is perhaps due to Tiebout (1956) who 
hypothesize that competition among communities might result in an efficiency level of the 
public good provision at the local level, if fully mobile households could choose a jurisdiction 
or  a  locality  that  provides  the  best  fiscal  packages,  which  met  their  preferences.  This 
conjecture is further elaborated by Oates (1972, 1993, 1999), and supported by, among others, 
Bird (1993), Gramlich (1993) and Brueckner (1999, 2006). However, Bewley  (1981) and 
Gordon (1983), among others, present the opposite views, suggesting that the Tiebout-Oates 
conjecture in favor of fiscal federalism may no longer hold. 
Despite few attempts at theoretical analyses, there has been substantial research in the 
empirical arena focusing on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth. Empirical evidences on this relationship are mixed, however. Weingast (1995), Lin 
and Liu (2000), Akai and Sakata (2002), Thiesen (2003), Stansel (2005), Iimi (2005), and Jin, 
Qian, and Weingast (2005), among others, have found a positive relationship between fiscal 
decentralization  and  economic  growth  after  conducting  a  variety  of  country  case  studies, 
while some authors find a negative relation (e.g., Zhang and Zou, 1998; Davoodi and Zou, 
1998; Xie, Zou and Davoodi, 1999), or no relation (e.g., Woller and Phillips, 1998; Thornton, 
2007).   
The objective of this paper is to fill the gap in the ongoing theoretical literatures of fiscal 
federalism  that  focuses  on  the  dynamic  aspects  of  the  choice  of  tax  bases  toward  the 
steady-state levels of capital accumulation and social welfare. This analysis, to our knowledge, 
is not well established in academic literatures. Our basic model mainly relies on the work of 
Brueckner  (1999)  and  some  parts  of  our  formulation  exhibit  a  similar  pattern  to  that  of 
Brueckner  (2006).  We  differ  from  these  studies  in  two  respects.  First,  we  formulate  the 
behavior  of  the  government  under  the  two  systems  in  maximizing  social  welfare  by 
introducing six possible cases of the government’s taxing policy toward individuals (in order 
to finance the public goods provision), where previous models described the behavior of both 
individuals and government in a simultaneous-move Nash game. In this sense, we consider 
the government’s choice on the proportional tax bases, where previous models use a head tax   2 
instrument.
1  Second,  we  clarify  the  social  welfare  comparison  between  the  two  systems, 
which is informally argued in the Brueckner (1999) while we depart from Brueckner (2006) 
by abstracting our analysis from human capital and economic growth.   
We report two main findings: first, the system  that uses a consumption and a capital 
income tax bases will have a higher steady state level of capital accumulation than the system 
that  uses  a  wage  tax  base.  Our  first  finding  provides  another  interpretation  on  the 
understanding of steady-state level of capital accumulation in both systems, as previously 
argued by Brueckner (1999). In fact, he claimed that that the steady-state level of capital 
accumulation in fiscal federalism is higher (lower) than that of under the unitary system if the 
young generation has a lower (higher) demand for public goods (which will influence the 
savings level). In this formulation, our finding suggests that, as long as each system uses the 
same tax base, then the steady state levels of capital accumulation under the two systems are 
equivalent.   
Second, the social welfare levels in fiscal federalism and the unitary system under a 
consumption tax base are equivalent if individuals’ rate of time preference is equal to the 
interest rate at which they choose their level of consumption stream. In addition, the social 
welfare levels in the two systems under the wage and capital income tax bases are equivalent 
if and only if the rate of time preference is equal to the population growth rate. 
  Our second finding might be in contrast with the result suggested by Brueckner (1999), 
which showed that, as long as the golden rule welfare condition—the condition in which the 
marginal product of capital in the steady state is defined to be equal to the population growth 
rate— is satisfied, the social welfare level under fiscal federalism is greater than that under 
the  unitary  system.  In  our  formulation,  this  golden  rule  welfare  condition  is  a  sufficient 
condition which makes the level of social welfare level under fiscal federalism is equal to that 
of under the unitary system.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, while section 3 
provides equilibrium characteristics and the solutions of the model. Section 4 presents the 
comparison between the two systems. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. The Model 
The basic framework relies on the model of Brueckner (1999), modified to include the six 
possible cases on how government’s choice of the tax bases policy could be formulated. In 
our model, each region is populated by two generations, the young and old, who are assumed 
to live for two periods. When young, individual works and divides the resulting labor income 
between consumption, saving and a tax payment. Then, during the old period, the individual 
consumes the savings and any interest he or she earns, pays a tax and dies. In all cases, we 
assume  that  the  population  grows  at  a  constant  rate  , n   where  . 0 > n   In  this  case,  we 
assume  that  the  population  of  the  young  generation  is  as  large  as  ) 1 ( n + of  the  old 
population.  The  consumption  of  both  generations  is  divided  into  consumption  of  private 
goods,  , i c and of public goods,  , i g   where subscript  idenotes cases A, B, C, D, E and F. 
Following  Brueckner  (1999),  public  good  is  provided  by  the  government  and  could  be 
consumed by both generations. It is assumed that this public good is a publicly produced 
private good. In addition, the difference between fiscal federalism and the unitary system is 
that,  under  fiscal  federalism,  each  generation  is  living  in  a  segregated  homogenous 
community; while in the unitary system, both generations are living together in the same 
                                                 
1  In fact, we have also analyzed the government taxing policy by using a head tax instrument, following the 
similar pattern of analysis we use in this paper. The result is consistent with the findings which this paper has 
drawn.   3 
community. In this federalist system, any kinds of public goods such as police protection and 
recreational place could then be provided specifically by following a specific demand of the 
young  and  old.  Although  the  assumption  of  a  segregate  community  under  the  federalist 
system is lack of realism due to the facts that, as in the spirit of Brueckner (1999), most 
communities are usually inhabited by both young and old generations, we might hope that this 
formulation might present a reference for academic exercises and a practical relevance for any 
related policies on this ground. Needless to say, for all public goods provisions, we abstract 
from the constraint of capacity and congestion.   
The  public  goods  provision  is financed  by  a  tax,  , i τ   imposed  on  young  and/or  old 
generations. In addition to the subscript  i  mentioned earlier, we also use the time subscripts 
index  t and  , 1 + t   throughout  this  paper,  which  denote  the  periods,  and  the  superscripts 
y and  , o   which  denote  the  young  and  old,  respectively.  The  per-capita  consumption  of 
private goods are 
y
t i c (for young individuals born at  tin case ) i   and o
t i c
1 + (for old individuals 
born at  tin case ), i   while analogous definitions also apply to consumption taxes,
y




t c i + τ a wage tax,  ,
t w i τ and a capital income tax,  .
1 + t y i τ    
 
2.1. Individual behavior under Fiscal Federalism (case A, B and C) 
The respective budget constraints for the young and old in case A are 
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where
t A s and 
t A w respectively, are the level of saving and wage of the young individual at  t, 
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The formulation of individuals’ utility function adopts the Brueckner’s (2006) type. The 
utility function is separable for both generations, in which, utility of the old is discounted by a 
rate of time preference,  . ρ   For simplicity, we define the level of  ρ   as well as the level of 
α are  all  identical  for  all  cases.  Thus,  the  utility  function  of  generation  t  individual  is 
assumed to be a log-linear utility function and can be given as 
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where in this function, 
y
t i g   and  o
t i g
1 +   respectively, denote the consumption of public goods 
by the young and old born at  . t Under this function, individuals maximize their utility subject 
to budget constraint as described in equation (3). By defining  λ as a Lagrange-multiplier, we 
can perform an optimization procedure to obtain 
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in which, by using (5) and (3), we can derive the 
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In case B, the budget constraints for the young and old respectively, are     
, ) 1 (
t B
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By  following  an  optimization  procedure  as  explained  above,  we  can  derive  o
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+ and 
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By following a similar standard optimization procedure we can obtain  o
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2.2. Individual behavior under the Unitary System (case D, E and F) 
In the cases D, E and F, we follow the same formulation as previously conducted in the cases 
A, B and C respectively. We might then get the levels of private consumption and saving 
under these cases which are similar to those under fiscal federalism by adjusting the relevant 
subscripts for each case.   
 
2.3. Firm’s production function 
In each system, firm produces goods, pays wages for the labor input,  ,
t i L   and makes rental 
payments for the capital input,  .
t i K   Technology is represented by a production function:   5 
β β − =
1
t i t i t i L K Y , which exhibits constant returns to scale ( 1 0 < < β ). The per-capita term of 
the production function is 
,
β
t i t i k y =                                                                                                                 (19) 
where  the  output-labor  ratio  and  capital-labor  ratio,  respectively,  are: 
. / ; /
t i t i t i t i t i t i L K k L Y y ≡ ≡  
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, ) 1 (
β
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where 
t i r and 
t i w both describe the factor prices of production inputs.     
 
2.4. Equilibrium   
Capital market clearing condition is defined such that a total saving of the young generation is 
equal to a capital stock in the next period. This condition could be stated as 
. ) 1 (
1 + + =
t i t i k n s                                                                                                                 (22) 
By substituting the level of saving of each case to this equation, we can get the levels of the 
next period capital stock for the six cases as follows: 
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3. Government’s behavior 
To see the effect of government’s behavior, suppose that the economy is on the steady state. 
In this sense, the capital stock per worker is constant from one period to the next, which 
implies the marginal products of capital and labor are then constant over time, yielding a 
constant wage  w  and interest rate  . r   To further analyze the capital stock accumulation in a 
steady  state,  let 
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c i i k τ τ τ τ , , , , *   represent  the  steady-state  values  of,  respectively,  the  capital  stock,  a 
consumption tax for each young and old, a wage tax and a capital income tax in casei. We 
then  consider  this  steady  state  condition  while  conducting  analyses  on  the  government’s 
behavior.   
 
3.1. Under fiscal federalism   
In  this  system,  the  regional  government  chooses  the  optimal  values  of  public  goods  by 
considering the behavior of individuals’ born at certain generation. Since we are considering 
the behavior of the government in the steady state, maximizing the social welfare of certain 
generation is similar to the maximizing the social welfare of generations living at certain 
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for the case B, and finally, 
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for the case C.   
 
3.2. Under the Unitary System 
In this system, the government can only provide a common level of public goods for both 
generations. The budget constraints of the government in cases D, E and F respectively could 
be given as   
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In the equations (29)-(35),  ais a linear technology parameter in the production of public 
goods and assumed to be equivalent in all six cases. 
 
3.3. The levels of public goods and proportional taxes   
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In fiscal federalism, the regional government could determine each level of consumption tax 
for both generations in order to provide a specific level of public goods for them. In order to 
maximize the generation  s t' utility level in each period of its life, the regional government 
defines its objective function as 
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and accordingly, 
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By following a similar fashion, we can get   7 
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for the case C (Please see Appendices A, B and C for more details). 
In the unitary system, taxes impose on both generations follow the similar formulation to 
that of under fiscal federalism (Please see Appendices D, E and F for more details). For the 
case D, the consumption tax is equivalent between the two generations, which is equal to 
, ) 1 ( α α −   and accordingly, the public good level for this case is 
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As for the case E, we again follow the similar aforementioned procedure to get   
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and finally in the case F, we can obtain 
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3.4. The Steady State of Capital Accumulation 
After inserting the relevant wage tax values into the equations (24) and (27), we can obtain 
the values of steady state of capital accumulation as previously stated in equations (23)-(28) 
as follow 
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4. The comparisons between the two systems 
4.1. The comparison of steady-state levels of capital accumulation   
It  is  easy  to  see  that  since  , 1 α >   * * *
B C A k k k > = under  fiscal  federalism  and 
* * *
E F D k k k > = under  the  unitary  system.  In  addition,  when  we  consider  the  same  tax  base 
under the two systems, we might conclude that:  . ; ; * * * * * *
F C E B D A k k k k k k = = = We summarize 
our finding in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. In both systems—fiscal federalism and the unitary system,—the system that 
uses a consumption and a capital income tax bases will have a higher steady state level of 
capital accumulation than the system that uses a wage tax base. In addition, as long as each 
system uses the same tax base, then the steady state levels of capital accumulation under the 
two systems are equivalent. 
 
4.2. The comparison of social welfare levels 
Let  i W   be  the  social  welfare  levels  under  case  A-F  respectively.  In  comparing  the  two 
systems, we measure the welfare levels for the same tax base, for instance, the social welfare 
under fiscal federalism and the unitary system if they use a consumption tax base, a wage tax 
and a capital income tax respectively. We consider the government objective function stated 
in equation (36) as the social welfare function. Then, after inserting the relevant values of 
per-capita consumption of private goods and public goods for each case, we could make a 
simple logarithmic comparison between the systems. Since from the proposition 1 we know 
that steady state levels of capital accumulation under the two system which use the same tax 
base are equivalent, we could proceed the comparisons more easily as follows: 
,
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From (57), we can observe  D A W W − will depend on the magnitude of 
1 * ,
− β β A k n and  . ρ To get 
a clear result of it, it is necessary to assume certain conditions. By recalling (20)’ in which, in 
the  steady  state,  we  might  assume  that  ,
1 *
A A r k =
− β β which  implies  .
1 *
D D r k =
− β β Thus, 
D A W W = if  . ρ = = D A r r As  for  the  (58)  and  (59),  we  can  clearly  see  that  the  value  of 
E B W W − and  F C W W − will  depend  on  the  magnitude  of  ρ and  . n Thus,  E B W W = and 
F C W W = if and only if  . n = ρ Unless this condition is satisfied, the comparison stated in (58) 
and  (59)  will  yield  ambiguous  values.  We  summarize  these  findings  in  the  following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. Suppose that the economy is on the steady state. The social welfare levels 
under fiscal federalism and the unitary system under a consumption tax base are equivalent if   9 
individuals’ rate of time preference is equal to the interest rate. The social welfare levels 
under fiscal federalism and the unitary system under the wage and capital income tax bases 
are equivalent if and only if the rate of time preference is equal to the population growth rate. 
 
The  intuition  behind  this  proposition  could  be  stated  as  follows.  First,  the  condition  of 
ρ = A r   means that individuals’ rate of time preference is equal to the interest rate at which 
they  choose  their  level  of  consumption  stream.  In  this  case,  there  is  a  stable  level  of 
consumption, as in the spirit of Olson and Bailey (1981). In addition, although the condition 
of  ρ > A r   is more consistent to the common condition in the real world since in almost cases, 
capital has a positive net marginal product, the condition that individuals choose a level of 
consumption stream if the interest rate is equal to the rate of time preference clearly holds for 
multiperiod  as  well  as  two-period  cases  (Samuelson,  1937).  Finally,  by  following  the 
condition of  , ρ = A r   n = ρ implies that  , n rA = which is known as the golden rule welfare 
condition. If this condition is satisfied, then we might conclude that the social welfare level 
under fiscal federalism is equivalent to that of under the unitary system. This finding might 
suggest that fiscal federalism is not necessarily superior to the unitary system. 
On the other hand, we also compare the levels of social welfare in the same system as a 
result of the choice of a different tax base. However, the results show that these comparisons 
yield ambiguous values, except for the comparison between a consumption tax base and a 
wage tax base.   
5  Conclusion 
The analyses in this paper suggest that the greater steady-state levels of capital accumulation 
and social welfare under fiscal federalism and the unitary system may constitute an additional 
benefit of the proper choice of tax bases. These results, deriving from the six possible cases of 
the government’s tax bases policy toward individuals, suggest that the level of steady-state 
capital accumulation and social welfare under fiscal federalism is equal to that of under the 
unitary system as long as certain conditions are satisfied. While the present results emerge 
from a model based on a very simple formulation, the additional theoretical works are clearly 
needed. Exploring the richer model by incorporating, for instance, the conditions of capital 
and  household  mobility  and  the  taxation  mix  policy  might  be  fruitful.  These  possible 
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Appendix A 
Since we are considering a steady state condition, we must rearrange the relevant values of 
the levels of private consumption for all cases in the steady state. As for the case A, we utilize 
the equations (6), (7) (29) and (30), and then insert them into (36) by incorporating (20)’ and 
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(A1) 
By performing an optimization problem in respect to 
y
c A τ   and  , o
c A τ we can get the relevant 
first order conditions as follows: 
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Thus, the levels of public good for young and old, respectively, are as stated in equation (38) and 
(39).   
 
Appendix B 
We follow the similar process as in Appendix A by using equations (11), (12), and (31) for 
the case B to get   
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Note that, in this case, we reformulate the regional government to choose the level of public 
goods and, by using these values, we can determine the level of a wage tax. Performing a 
standard  optimization  procedure  with  respect  to 
y
B g and  , o
B g we  can  obtain  the  levels  of 
public goods as stated in equations (40) and (41). The level of wage tax is accordingly given 
by equation (42). 
 
Appendix C 
As for the case C, by using equations (16), (17), and (32), we can formulate     11 
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. log ) 1 (
) 1 )( (



























































































  (C1) 
Solving (C1) for 
y
C g   and  o
C g , we can get the levels of public goods and eventually a capital 
income tax as previously stated in equations (43)-(45). 
 
Appendix D 
Since the levels of private consumption under case D are similar to that of case A, we recall 
(6) and (7), replace its subscript A’s to become subscript D’s and consider its value in the 
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From the government’s budget constraint in the case D as stated in equation (33), we can 
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Plugging (D3) and (D4) into (36) and solving it for , D g we can obtain (46) and accordingly, 
the level of  .
D c τ  
 
Appendix E 
We follow similar formulation to that of case D by using (11) and (12) adjusted to have an E’s 
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                                                                  (E4) 
Plugging (E3) and (E4) into (36) and solving it for  , E g we can get the levels of public good 
and wage tax in case E as previously stated in equations (47) and (48).   12 
Appendix F 
We follow similar formulation to that of case D by using (16) and (17) adjusted to have an F’s 
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=                                                                                                   (F2) 
Then, we use the government’s budget constraint as stated in (35) to get 
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c                                                                                 (F4) 
Plugging (F3) and (F4) into (36) and solving it for  , F g we can get the levels of public good 
































   13 
References 
Akai,  N.  and  M.  Sakata  (2002)  “Fiscal  decentralization  contributes  to  economic  growth: 
Evidence  from  state-level  cross  section  data  for  the  United  States”  Journal  of  Urban 
Economics  52,  93-108. 
 
Auerbach, A.J. and L.J. Kotlikoff (1987) Dynamic fiscal policy, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge.   
 
Barro, R.J. and X.Sala-i-Martin (2004) Economic growth, 2
nd Edition, MIT Press. 
 
Bewley,  T.F.  (1981)  “A  critique  of  Tiebout’s  theory  of  local  public  expenditures” 
Econometrica        49, No.3,  713-740. 
 
Bird,  R.  (1993)  “Threading  the  fiscal  labyrinth:  Some  issues  in  fiscal  decentralization” 
National Tax Journal  XLVI, 207-227. 
 
Brueckner,  J.K.  (1999)  “Fiscal  federalism  and  capital  accumulation”  Journal  of  Public 
Economic Theory 11, No.2, 205-224.   
 
Brueckner,  J.K.  (2006)  “Fiscal  federalism  and  economic  growth”  Journal  of  Public 
Economics 90, 2107-2120. 
 
Davoodi,  H.  and  H.  Zou  (1998)  “Fiscal  decentralization  and  economic  growth:  A  cross 
country study” Journal of Urban Economics 43, 244-257. 
 
Diamond, P.A. (1965) “National debt in a neoclassical growth model” American Economic 
Review 55, 1125-1150. 
 
Gordon,  R.  (1983)  “An  optimal  tax  approach  to  fiscal  federalism”  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics 97, 567-586. 
 
Gramlich, E. (1993) “A policy maker’s guide to fiscal decentralization” National Tax Journal 
XLVI, 229-235. 
 
Iimi, A. (2005) “Decentralization and economic growth revisited: An empirical note” Journal 
of Urban Economics 57, 449-461. 
 
Jin, H., Y. Qian, and B.R. Weingast (2005) “Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: 
Federalism, Chinese style” Journal of Public Economics 89, 1719-1742. 
 
Lin, J., and Z. Liu (2000) ”Fiscal decentralization and economic growth in China” Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 49, No.1, 1–22. 
 
Oates,  W.E. (1972) Fiscal federalism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: New York. 
   
Oates,  W.E.  (1993)  “Fiscal  decentralization  and  economic  development”  National  Tax 
Journal 46 No.2, 237-43.   
   14 
Oates,  W.E.  (1998)  The  economics  of  fiscal  federalism  and  local  finance,  Edward 
Elgar:London. 
 
Oates,  W.E.  (1999)  “An  essay  on  fiscal  federalism”  Journal  of  Economic  Literature 
XXXVII (September 1999), 1120-1149. 
 
Olson, M. and M.J.Bailey (1981) “Positive time preference” Journal of Political Economy 69, 
No.1, 1-25. 
 
Romer, D. (2001) Advanced macroeconomics, McGraw Hill: New York. 
 
Samuelson, P.A. (1937) “A note on measurement of utility” Review of Economic Studies 4, 
155-161. 
 
Stansel,  D.  (2005)  “Local  decentralization  and  economic  growth:  A  cross-sectional 
examination of US metropolitan areas” Journal of Urban Economics 57, 55-72. 
 
Stiglitz, J.E. (2000) Economics of the public sector, 3
rd Ed. W.W. Norton and Company. 
 
Thiesen,  U.  (2003)  “Fiscal  decentralization  and  economic  growth  in  high  income  OECD 
countries” Fiscal Studies 24, 237-274. 
 
Thornton, J. (2007) “Fiscal decentralization and economic growth reconsidered” Journal of 
Urban Economics 61, 64-70. 
 
Tiebout, C. (1956) “A pure theory of local expenditures” Journal of Political Economy 64, 
416-424. 
 
Weingast,  B.R.  (1995)  “The  economic  role  of  political  institutions:  Market-preserving 
federalism and economic development” Journal of Law Economic Organization 11, 1-31. 
 
Woller, G.M. and K. Phillips (1998) “Fiscal decentralization and LDC economic growth: An 
empirical investigation” Journal of Development Studies 34, Issue: 4, 139-148. 
 
Xie, D., H. Zou, and H. Davoodi (1999) “Fiscal decentralization and economic growth in the 
United States” Journal of Urban Economics 45, 228-239. 
 
Zhang,  T. and H. Zou (1998) “Fiscal decentralization, public spending, and economic growth 
in China” Journal of Public Economics 67, 221-240. 
 
 